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Local Government in Northern Ireland:
Emerging from the Bearpit of Sectarianism?
COLIN KNOX
The ongoing multi-party talks on the future constitutional
arrangements for Northern Ireland overshadow much of the day-
to-day business of local government. Yet there are signs that
councils, despite their relatively minor functions, are emerging as
important cross-community players in Northern Ireland. This
paper examines the key events in local government since 1973, the
main issues currently facing councils and offers a prospective
assessment of their future role.
Northern Ireland has moved from a situation where there were too
many democratic bodies lacking the necessary checks and balances to
prevent them from being abused by the elected representatives, to a
position where local government structures are largely powerless.
What is now lacking are the necessary checks and balances to prevent
abuse by the minister's nominees, by bureaucrats and indeed by
ministers, none of whom are answerable to the Northern Ireland
electorate ... a political vacuum. I want to see local government filling
the vacuum in Northern Ireland. (Ken Maginnis MP, Ulster Unionist
Party, 1992:100)
Giving some councils restored powers would be like inviting Erich
Honeker back to implement the reform programme in East Germany.
(Alban Maginness, SDLP Mayor of Belfast City Council, 1990:4)
These two juxtapositions best illustrate the different party political positions
on local government in Northern Ireland. Its relatively minor functional role
belies its symbolic importance as an elected forum which has survived
intact when one political initiative after another has foundered at the macro-
level.
Local councils have three main roles: an executive role in which they
provide certain regulatory services (for example, building regulations,
environmental health, licensing of dance halls, cinemas) and the provision
of a limited range of functions such as street cleaning, refuse collection,
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2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
cemeteries and crematoria, recreation and tourist amenities and economic
development; a representative role where members are nominated to serve
on area boards (for example, education and library boards); and a
consultative role where councils' views are sought on centrally provided
services such as planning, roads, water and housing.
These seemingly innocuous roles have attracted a degree of criticism.
The absence of major functional responsibilities, combined with no regional
tier of government, has turned council chambers into a forum for occasional
vitriolic and sectarian debate on constitutional and security issues well
beyond their remit. By the same token, there is some doubt about the calibre
of councillor attracted to a relatively powerless body. From the councils'
perspective there is growing unease that their representative role is being
eroded (for example, removal of councillors from health boards) under
restructuring of central services. An ongoing problem is that government
departments and agencies, responsible for providing central services in
council areas, treat consultation as a token gesture, at best, or a derisory
intervention by councillors with narrow parochial interests, at worst.
A discussion on the role of local government within the overall public
administration system in Northern Ireland may seem rather academic given
its minor functions. Estimated net spending by councils in 1997/98, for
example, amounts to £23 Om, approximately 2.7 per cent (Department of the
Environment (NI), 1997) out of a Northern Ireland public expenditure
budget of £9 billion. Yet the study of local authorities is important for other
reasons. First, whatever form of political accommodation is reached during
the ongoing multi-party talks, a future restructuring of the various tiers of
government is inevitable and will involve a reassessment of the role of
councils. Second, in the absence of any devolved government, councillors
are the most accessible source for constituents with concerns about centrally
provided services (housing, planning and social security in particular).
Third, councils employ about 9,000 people in an economy noted for its high
level of unemployment. It is for these reasons that we consider local
government in some detail. Our discussions are structured in three parts:
(a) political milestones - an overview of key events in local government
since reorganisation in 1973;
(b) administrative realities - an examination of the main issues facing
councils at present;
(c) future possibilities - a prospective assessment of local government.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 3
POLITICAL MILESTONES
The present system of local government in Northern Ireland is based upon
recommendations contained in the Report of the Review Body on Local
Government in Northern Ireland (Macrory Report of 1970). The report was
the final outcome of pressure to reform local government in the 1960s based
on two quite distinct but complementary sources. First, the Northern Ireland
Government at Stormont undertook a campaign to modernise local
government (beginning in March 1966 - parallel reforms were afoot in
Great Britain: Redcliffe-Maud, 1969 and Wheatley, 1972) and remedy its
defects and, second, there was dissatisfaction with its performance at a
political level. The main administrative defect was the large number of
small local authorities which existed with a small rate base, and hence
limited financial resources (73 elected councils for 1.5 million population).
The key political defects were grievances expressed by the minority
community over religious discrimination by some local authorities in
employment and housing, a motivating factor behind the civil rights protests
in 1968 and subsequent outbreak of disturbance (Whyte, 1990). In the wake
of considerable violence, housing was removed from the remit of local
government which, to a large extent, dictated future administrative reforms.
The Macrory Report divided services into regional (requiring large
administrative units) and district (suitable for small areas) services. The
Stormont Parliament would take responsibility for regional services and 26
councils would administer district services (the influence here was the
Wheatley Commission on Scottish local government). The
recommendations of the report were overtaken, however, by the abolition of
Stormont in 1972 and responsibility for regional services now rests with the
British government working administratively through the Northern Ireland
Office — direct rule.
Local government in Northern Ireland therefore evolved from the
turmoil of the early 1970s against a background of special circumstances
which the Macrory Review Body felt were crucial factors in their proposals.
The existence of a regional government at Stormont as a sine qua non in any
future administrative structure underpinned the recommendations. Its
abolition embittered Unionists and, in their view, effectively destroyed local
democratic institutions. The absence of a regional tier is referred to as the
'Macrory Gap', something of a misnomer since he was not responsible for
it and argued later that it made a nonsense of his proposals (Fitzgerald,
1978).
Three issues of political significance are worthy of discussion since local
government emerged in its reorganised form in October 1973: the election
of Sinn Fein to local councils; the Unionist protest campaign against the
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4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
Anglo-Irish Agreement and; the development of 'responsibility sharing' in
councils.
In 1985 Sinn Fein contested council elections for the first time and
secured 59 seats (out of 566),1 11.8 per cent of the vote (Knox, 1990).
Although they had contested the Assembly, Westminster and European
elections of October 1982, June 1983 and June 1984, respectively, their
presence in council chambers was anathema to Unionists. Both Unionist
parties (DUP and UUP) pledged in election campaigns to 'smash Sinn Fein'
and subsequently employed tactics to isolate their councillors by excluding
them from committees and preventing them from speaking, where possible
(Connolly and Knox, 1988). These tactics were legally challenged and
found to be unlawful and void by the High Court. Further attempts to
exclude Sinn Fein by demanding that councillors sign a declaration against
violence were also challenged by a judicial review, and again Unionists
were defeated. Despite continuous disruptions in council chambers, with
occasional fist-fights breaking out, the government refused to proscribe
Sinn Fein in response to Unionist pressure. At the same time, government
ministers would not receive delegations or correspond personally with Sinn
Fein members - perceived as double standards by Unionists. The Anglo-
Irish Agreement of November 1985 ushered in a new wave of protest.
Despite government assurances to the contrary, Unionists viewed the
Anglo-Irish Agreement as thinly veiled joint sovereignty over the Province
by Dublin and London. Their burgeoning local government protest against
Sinn Fein was superseded by a campaign of Unionist opposition against a
'sell-out' to Dublin. Eighteen Unionist-controlled councils adopted a policy
of adjourning all council meetings and refusing to strike a district rate. They
argued that to administer local government was to give tacit support to the
London-Dublin partnership (Connolly and Knox, 1988). The decision to
suspend meetings and delegate business to council officials was tested in
court and, once again, Unionists were defeated. Faced with Unionist
recalcitrance over the affair, the minister took new powers to appoint a
commissioner and empower council officials to carry out council functions.
Belfast and Castlereagh Councils, at the forefront of the protest campaign,
remained defiant despite legal contempt proceedings against them on the
policy of adjournment, and eventually the government stepped in to
maintain essential services. Yet cracks began to appear in the protest
campaign. A mass resignation proposal of all UUP and DUP councillors
was rejected, some local authorities met to strike a rate for the financial year
1987/88, and accusations abounded of surreptitious business taking place in
some Unionist councils. The protest campaign against the Anglo-Irish
Agreement at local government level was proving counter-productive.
Services continued to be provided amidst fears that Nationalist councils
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 5
were gaining more resources through regular ministerial contacts. The
protest withered away to an inauspicious end.
The local government elections of 1989 marked a turning point in
council chambers, with a degree of moderation not unrelated to the decline
in representation from the political extremes. From this more stable political
context an experiment in 'responsibility sharing' developed (this term
evolved in deference to Unionist sensitivities over 'power sharing').
Dungannon District Council is credited with leading the way in rotating the
council chair between the two main political parties, the SDLP and UUP.2
In addition, the Enniskillen bombing of November 1987 appears to have
had a profound impact upon local politicians. One observer noted that
councillors 'felt the need to bring an end to sterile adversarial politics ... and
found in their opposition to political violence more in common than they
had previously recognised' (Beirne, 1993:7). In the wake of the 1989 local
government elections, 11 local authorities appointed mayors/chairs and
deputies from both political traditions. The power-sharing trend continued
after the 1993 local government elections and there are encouraging signs
that a climate of accommodation now exists in councils, conspicuously
absent at the macro-level. Even the more tempestuous councils (for
example, Belfast, Craigavon) can now boast power-sharing arrangements.
The 1997 local government elections produced Belfast's first nationalist
Lord Mayor in its 150-year history and 12 councils, mainly nationalist
controlled or hung, currently (1997/98) operate power-sharing
arrangements.
ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES
By its nature a cursory examination of the main issues facing local
government at present must be selective. Four quite distinct areas have been
chosen to represent the breadth of topical issues which face councils;
economic development, community relations, compulsory competitive
tendering/'best value' and local government finance. These are discussed in
order.
Economic Development
Until 1992, local authorities were relatively small-part players in the field
of economic development. Their involvement was limited to making
contributions to any voluntary body which developed trade, industry and
commerce in their area (section 107, Local Government Act 1972) or, more
generally, for furthering 'the interests of the council, its district or
inhabitants' (section 115, Local Government Act 1972). Total payments
were limited to 3p in the pound on the rateable value of the district.
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6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
Key government agencies involved in this function are the Local
Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU) and the Industrial Development
Board (IDB). LEDU is responsible for encouraging small firms to play an
effective part in strengthening the economy of Northern Ireland and had a
budget of £31.3m in 1995-96. (Department of Finance and Personnel, H.M.
Treasury, 1995). The IDB aims to introduce and develop internationally
competitive companies in the manufacturing and tradeable service sectors
and spent £135m in 1995-96. Put in perspective, expenditure by both
central economic development agencies represents about 75 per cent of the
total budgets for all 26 district councils.
Since 1992, however (under article 28 of the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (NI) Order 1992), councils have been permitted
to spend up to 5p in the pound from rates for the specific purpose of
economic development. For the year 1995/96 this amounted to £9m
spending overall by the councils (Department of the Environment (NI),
1997). Clearly this is insignificant when compared with the budgets of
government agencies, but councils have been energetic in its usage. They
have embraced the function of economic development enthusiastically, put
party differences aside and committed themselves to the welfare and
employment prosperity of their council areas. The more innovative have
established extensive networks with private companies, set up arms-length
enterprise development facilities and used their limited resources as seed-
corn finance or matching grants to tap into larger EC funding sources. A
recent review of councils' involvement in this functional area cautioned
against the fragmentation of the economic development effort, given the
number of agencies involved, but also highlighted two key advantages
arising from their role. First, local authorities acted as 'a co-ordinator of
local efforts and mediator between regional agencies and local
communities' and, second, their potential to lever substantial funds from
other sources, by a factor of 25 times in the case of Fermanagh District
Council (Scott and Hoyle, 1996: 231).
Community Development/Community Relations
The increasing prominence of councils in economic development as a
function has been paralleled by their involvement in the field of community
relations. Community development work pre-dates the involvement of
councils with cross-community groups under the umbrella of community
relations. A number of councils seized the opportunity at an early stage to
invest (with government assistance) in community development policies at
grassroots level. In 1989 the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU)3
invited councils to participate in a community relations programme aimed
at developing cross-community contact and co-operation, promoting greater
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 7
mutual understanding and increasing respect for different cultural traditions.
The CCRU offered 75 per cent grant-aid for the employment of community
relations staff by councils, the provision of financial support for appropriate
cross-community activities, and assistance with the development of local
heritage and cultural activities. The 1995/96 CCRU budget for the
programme was £1.7m, matched by a 25 per cent addition from councils.
Councils responded to the CCRU invitation with varying degrees of
enthusiasm. The first council (Dungannon) joined the scheme in February
1990 but it was not until 1993 that all 26 local authorities were involved in
the initiative which, at the outset, received funding for three years (Belfast
City Council has since detached itself following some internal problems).
Despite the staggered starting pattern of councils, the inexperience of
newly appointed community relations officers and the scope of the task,
funding sources were renewed and the programme subsequently extended
until 1998 following a favourable evaluation (Knox et al., 1994). Given the
conditions associated with joining the initiative (for example, agreement on
a cross-party basis to participate), vesting responsibility for community
relations in local councils was, from a government perspective a way of
promoting consensus at the political level and in turn, by example, in the
community. The community relations remit put consensus firmly on the
policy agenda of councils, which is symbolically important in making
progress on the wider political front. Moreover, an active involvement in
this area, given their chequered history of discrimination and sectarianism,
has added to the emerging climate of cross-party co-operation and stability,
within which local authorities have demonstrated a more responsible
approach to an incremental increase in devolved powers.
Compulsory Competitive Tendering/'Best Value'
Aside from the new functional responsibilities discussed above, local
authorities in Northern Ireland have been preoccupied with compulsory
competitive tendering of their services. The process began with a
consultative document published by the Department of the Environment
(NI) in 1988 on competition in the provision of district council services.
Following consultation, which attracted widespread but ineffective cross-
party opposition, a draft Miscellaneous Provisions Order was published in
1990. The Order was analogous to, and a direct transfer of, the principal
elements of the Local Government Act 1988 applied in Great Britain.
Despite initial predictions that CCT would not apply to the limited functions
of local government in Northern Ireland, in much the same way as councils
had 'escaped' the community charge and council tax reforms, it became a
reality in April 1994 for its phased application to council services.
Early assessments of CCT indicate that all 26 councils' contracts were
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8 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
won by their in-house direct service organisation (DSO) teams. Further, in
all cases the DSO bid was the lowest received. Estimates of savings vary
from 2-5 per cent (Chief Executives' Forum, 1996) to 25 per cent (Knox
and Young, 1995) for the first round of contract services tendered. These
short-term savings are of course influenced by significant start-up costs
associated with CCT, such as contract specification and client/contractor
organisational restructuring with concomitant staffing implications.
Two considerations are important in assessing the experience of councils
in Northern Ireland with CCT - the prevailing economic and political
circumstances respectively. The evidence emerging would suggest that
small local authority units which exist are unlikely to provide private
contractors with the necessary economies of scale. Further,
complementarity in services such as refuse collection, street cleaning and
grounds maintenance will put councils at an advantage in single contract
competition. Both conditions are likely to limit competition in the market
which has been the experience thus far. Competition would require multi-
functional contracts (refuse, street cleaning and grounds maintenance)
offered in no more than four or five areas covering the whole of Northern
Ireland (the four existing health board areas would seem sensible). Such a
suggestion, however, carries with it huge political implications for local
government and questions the very existence of 26 relatively small district
councils. Even within present arrangements, the idea of the 'contract
council' meeting to allocate their limited functions to the lowest bidder
serves only to exacerbate the perception that councillors in Northern Ireland
are becoming more marginalised, isolated and impotent. To some extent the
success of in-house bidders thus far has forestalled a political backlash on
the application of CCT.
With the advent of a Labour ministerial team in Northern Ireland,
following the 1997 Westminster elections, the concept of 'best value' will
be extended to district councils. This has resulted in an extension of the
timetable to tender (for the first time) leisure services, construction and
maintenance work until November 1998, so that changes envisaged under
'best value' can be taken on board.
Local Government Finance
The final issue of general significance to councils is the way in which local
authority services are financed. At present this is based on a property tax
system or rates, similar to that which operated in Britain prior to the
introduction of the poll tax. The tax base is the rentable value of the property
(residential and businesses) or its net annual value. Two rates of property
taxation are levied, the district rate which is set by each local authority for
services provided by them, and the regional rate fixed by central
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 9
government. The latter represents a payment towards the provision of
education, housing, personal social services, roads, water and sewerage,
referred to as 'local authority type services'. The regional rate is set at a
uniform level throughout Northern Ireland and is effectively a central
government tax. Both rates are collected by central government and the
product of the district rate repaid to local authorities.
Councils have three main sources of funding — the district rate, a general
grant and specific government grants (78 per cent, 18 per cent and four per
cent respectively in the 1996/97 budget estimates). The specific grants are a
proportion of approved expenditure for certain functions (for example,
community services) and are relatively small in nature. The general grant is
the principal grant towards the relief of rate income which takes account of
(a) loss of rate income arising from industrial de-rating and (b) a resources
element to help poorer councils afford a standard of service without the
need to levy excessive rate poundage (Barnett and Knox, 1992).
A report by the Comptroller and Auditor General highlighted three
major weaknesses in this system of financing local government (Northern
Ireland Audit Office, 1991). First, since the resources element of the general
grant is linked to the net expenditure of a council, increases in expenditure
increase its share of the grant. Second, the variable needs of the individual
councils are ignored in arriving at the percentage grant contribution to net
expenditure. There is an absence of any needs assessment. Finally, the
Comptroller outlined the main requirement for local accountability: 'a clear
and understandable relationship between local authorities' spending
decisions and the rate poundages they levy', and asked the Department of
the Environment to demonstrate this relationship (Northern Ireland Audit
Office, 1991:75). The department pointed to council procedures for
examining and approving estimates prior to setting the district rate, but was
unable to illustrate the causal link required.
Accountability in the Northern Ireland system is most obvious at both
political and financial levels. The regional/district rates split suggests
political accountability vested in central and local governments
respectively. This, however, is problematic. The district rate represents
approximately one-third of the total rate poundage and the remainder is the
regional rate for 'local authority-type' services. Since both rates are
collected together, the public perception of councils is not one of selective
political accountability for spending its portion of the rates but an overall
responsibility for finance derived from rates. Local councillors object
vehemently to a system in which the efficient provision of district services
is nullified by a regional layer of services over which they have no control
and whose costs account for an increasing proportion of the total rates bill.
The system of financing local government services is currently under
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10 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
review and a report is expected soon which addresses these fundamental
problems.
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
There have been calls both for greater devolution of power to local
government and a new form of regional government. In the former case,
Archbishop Eames, Church of Ireland Primate, in his submission to the
Opsahl Commission4 argued for more power to be given to local councils
where there was evidence of a sharing of responsibility. This, in his view,
would be part of a more systematic progression which entailed 'slow, steady
progress in building up inter-community confidence and trust' (Eames,
1993:4). In the latter, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, former head of the Northern
Ireland Civil Service, suggested a review in the form of Macrory II. Both
alternatives envisage a greater role for local government but acknowledge
that effective safeguards must exist to guard against abuses of power and
allay the fear of nationalists.
Notwithstanding these developments, local authorities have now
become major brokers in partnership arrangements designed to deliver
European-funded service programmes. Partnerships, of course, are neither a
new administrative mechanism nor a panacea for the 'democratic deficit'.
Partnership formation is now well established in Great Britain as an
approach to local area-based economic regeneration and is synonymous
with policy initiatives such as Urban Development Corporations, the City
Challenge, the Single Regeneration Budget, Training and Enterprise
Councils and Business Links (Bailey, 1994). The most recent example in
Northern Ireland is the Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation
and the Border Counties (1995), a £35Om EC package designed to reinforce
progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation
(Commission of European Communities Office, 1995). Approximately 15
per cent of the monies available has been allocated to partnerships as a
means of harnessing the energies and talents of the local community. Each
district council area is represented by a partnership comprising one-third
each, local councillors; community/voluntary, representatives; business and
trades union interests; as well as statutory organisations. The district
partnership bids against an allocation for their area (based on population
size weighted by an index of deprivation) through a plan of action drawn up
to advance the aims and objectives of the initiative. Local authorities have
been very successful in operationalising these partnership arrangements
despite some early suspicions that the voluntary and business sectors would
usurp the role of elected representatives. In a public administration system
characterised so completely by government appointees (the most recent
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 11
figures in Northern Ireland suggest there are 161 appointed executive
quangos, 38 advisory bodies and 15 tribunals) (Weir, 1994), partnerships at
the very least go some way towards representativeness and transparency in
decision taking and resource allocation. In short, partnerships have
harnessed the emerging goodwill in local authorities, mobilised an apathetic
business sector into taking ownership of social goals and energised the
voluntary sector which has played a vital role in community development.
Faced with a constitutional impasse, local authorities have acted, and can in
the future act, as a pivotal broker in partnership arrangements for delivering
public services.
There seems little doubt that the future role of local authorities will be
central to the administrative reorganisation accompanying any
constitutional agreement. What form councils will take is difficult to
predict, although it is unlikely that the equivalent unitary status reforms in
Great Britain will be replicated (Boyne, Jordan and Me Vicar, 1995). It is
also unlikely that 26 councils will be retained in Northern Ireland, not least
because of the efficiency arguments referred to in relation to discussions on
CCT/'best value' above. Either four or five large councils co-terminous
with health or education board areas seemed possible at one stage. With
current proposals to reorganise the education sector and reduce the number
of boards, however, this now appears less likely. Developments elsewhere
in the public sector, such as the increase in the number of 'Next Steps'
agencies, particularly in the Department of the Environment (NI), makes
any future reshuffle of functions impossible to predict. Services which may
have been considered as possible candidates for devolution to larger
councils (for example, planning and minor roads) have been agentised.
Whether this makes it more or less difficult to increase the role of local
councils is in question.
The Labour minister responsible for local government in Northern
Ireland, Lord Dubs, has announced a number of initiatives since taking
office. He suggested the possibility of legislation to give councils 'a power
of general competence' to do what they consider appropriate in the interests
of their district and its people. Other initiatives include proposals to achieve
greater representation of councillors on public bodies, and fuller and more
meaningful consultation with district councils by central government,
particularly in planning, through the establishment of a planning advisory
board. These initiatives, he believes, 'will have a positive effect and will
serve to strengthen the position of local government and local governance
in the Province' (Dubs, 1997) .
Local authorities in Northern Ireland have emerged from an era
characterised by discrimination and sectarianism. A new climate of co-
operation now exists between political parties clearly manifest in the
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12 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES
additional functions which they undertake. 'Responsibility sharing'
arrangements, the common goal of economic development and councils'
pivotal role in partnership arrangements for EC-funded initiatives, have
created a measure of stability and replaced most partisan wrangling and the
tumultuous council meetings synonymous with local government in
Northern Ireland. Local politicians, rooted in communities, may reflect
more accurately the desired bottom-up momentum for accommodation
which has thus far eluded political leaders at the macro-level. It is perhaps
ironic, therefore, that local government, whose activities led, in part, to civil
rights protests in the late 1960s, now serve as an example of political co-
operation sadly lacking in the current search for a constitutional settlement.
NOTES
1. 'Sinn Fein and Local Elections: The Government's Response in Northern Ireland',
Parliamentary Affairs Vol.43, No.4 (1990), pp.448-63.
2. Some councils - Down, Omagh, Newry and Mourne, claim to have been doing this for years
in a less high-profile manner.
3. CCRU is a dedicated unit established within the central secretariat charged with formulating,
reviewing and challenging policy throughout the government system with the aim of
improving community relations.
4. The Opsahl Commission was a forum established in February 1993 to elicit community
views on the way forward in Northern Ireland.
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